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THE EVOLVING CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
MOVEMENT:
PROCEDURAL REFORMS HAVE GAINED STEAM,
BUT CRITICS STILL FOCUS ON ARGUMENTS OF
THE PAST

Mark A. Behrens*
Andrew W. Crouse **

I.

INTRODUCTION

For many years, most state and federal civil justice reform efforts
were focused on a few key areas: joint liability, punitive damages, product
liability, and health care liability.1 Some of these reforms were driven by
the rapid development of product liability law following judicial decisions
in the 1970s and 1980s to expand liability and the emergence of punitive
damages in such cases.2 Many of these efforts were successful. For
example, a large majority of states have abolished or modified the
traditional doctrine of joint liability3 and require an elevated burden of proof
standard for punitive damages liability.4

_______________________________________________________
* Mark A. Behrens is a partner in the law firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. in Washington, D.C. He
received his B.A. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1987 and his J.D. from Vanderbilt
University Law School in 1990. He was a member of the Vanderbilt Law Review.
** Andrew W. Crouse is an associate in the law firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. in Washington,
D.C. He received his B.A. from the University of Kansas in 2001 and his J.D. from Georgetown
University Law Center in 2004.
1
See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Tort Reform Past, Present and Future:
Solving Old Problems and Dealing with “New Style” Litigation, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 237, 241
(2000) [hereinafter Schwartz et al., Tort Reform Past, Present And Future].
2
See Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, A Proposal for Federal Product Liability Reform in the
New Millennium, 4 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 261 (2000); Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive
Damages Reform—State Legislatures Can and Should Meet The Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Haslip, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1365 (1993).
3
See Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the Crisis in the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined?, 38 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1121, 1148-50 (2005) (surveying state joint liability laws) [hereinafter Hantler et al]; Steven B.
Hantler et al., Moving Toward the Fully Informed Civil Jury, 3 Geo. J. of L. & Pub. Policy 21, 41 (2005).
4
See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for Reform by
Courts and Legislatures, 65 Brook. L. Rev. 1003 (2000) [hereinafter Schwartz et al., Reining In Punitive
Damages “Run Wild”].
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In recent years, the civil justice reform movement has evolved to
respond to changes in the legal landscape and to address new issues.
Defendant-supported civil justice efforts are increasingly focused on
procedural reforms that neither limit an injured person’s ability to sue nor
cap the amount of actual damages the person may recover. One such
example is the recently enacted federal Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA),
which was signed into law in February 2005.5 When the framers of the
United States Constitution established the federal court system, they
believed it would provide a neutral forum for hearing large claims involving
residents of different states.6 Until the passage of the CAFA, however,
lawyers filing class actions were able to use various tricks to escape from
the jurisdiction of federal courts.7 The CAFA closes some of these
loopholes to allow defendants to remove what were formerly nondiverse
state law class actions to federal courts if minimal diversity exits and the
aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. This effectively will
foreclose the joinder of local defendants to defeat complete diversity and
prevent removal. Truly local class actions will remain in state court.8
Nothing in the CAFA bars class actions or limits recoveries for class
members.
Various factors are driving civil defendants’ interest in pursing
procedural reforms, particularly at the state level. First, as stated, many
states have adopted more traditional tort reforms9—the “low hanging fruit”
has largely been picked. Significant reforms also have been adopted in
states such as Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas10—places with local courts
that, in the past, were often viewed as unfair to civil defendants, particularly

_______________________________________________________
5

Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 3(a), 119 Stat. 7 (2005).
See S. Rep. 109-14, at 6 (Fe. 28, 2005).
7
See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call for
Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 483 (2000).
8
In addition, the CAFA establishes a Class Action Bill of Rights with judicial review and approval of
non-cash settlements, protection against loss by class members because of payments to class counsel, a
prohibition against court approval of a proposed settlement that would provide for greater payments to
class members that are located in closer geographic proximity to the court, a prohibition against court
approval of a proposed settlement that would provide for payment of a greater share of the award to a
class representative serving on behalf of a class, standardized settlement notification information, and
specific requirements regarding proposed settlement notifications to federal and state officials. The
CAFA also addresses abusive coupon settlements by providing that contingency fees must be based on
the value to class members of coupons that are actually redeemed. See Sen. Rpt. 109-14 (Feb. 28, 2005);
see also Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s Clothes of Class
Actions, 18 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 1343 (2005).
9
See Paul H. Rubin, Tort Reform Saves Lives, Wall St. J. A7 (Oct. 8, 2005) (stating that from 1981-2000,
states passed 141 “tort reform” measures, including caps on noneconomic and punitive damages and
product liability reforms).
10
See e.g. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Now Open for Business: The Transformation of
Mississippi’s Legal Climate (unpublished ms., copy on file with Mississippi College Law Review).
6
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from the point of view of out-of-state corporate defendants.11 Ohio enacted
significant legal reforms in 2004.12 There are now few states where liability
and damages remain totally open-ended. Even in the states that have not
enacted tort reform laws, the United States Supreme Court’s recent
jurisprudence makes clear that constitutional due process limits apply to
constrain excessive punitive damages awards.13
Second, procedural reforms are being pursued in response to
successes that the plaintiffs’ bar has had in challenging substantive civil
justice reform laws on state constitutional grounds.14 These challenges have
been successful in some, but not most, states.15 Increased participation in
judicial elections is another way that business groups have responded to the
threat of “judicial nullification” of state tort reform.16
Third, procedural reforms are being pursued to respond to emerging
legal issues, such as the trend toward mass aggregation of cases through
coordinated state attorneys general litigation.17
Ironically, as the civil justice reform effort has changed focus,
critics of reform efforts seem intent on continuing arguments of the past.
Critics seem to be debating the merits of the cold war (e.g., whether caps on
damages are sound) while the legal reform efforts of business groups are
focused on other issues. One must question why this disconnect exists. It is
unlikely that critics of civil justice reform proposals are unaware of the
proposals being adopted today. One explanation, therefore, might be that
opponents of reform have chosen not to engage in a debate over the current

_______________________________________________________
11
The American Tort Reform Association calls these counties “Judicial Hellholes.” Am. Tort Reform
Assn., Bringing Justice to Judicial Hellholes (2004), http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/ [hereinafter
ATRA Hellholes Rep.].
12
See Kurt Tunnell et al., Once again . . . Ohio Legislators Approve Comprehensive Tort Reform, 20:23
Legal Backgrounder (Wash. Leg. Found.) (May 20, 2005).
13
See P. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
U.S. 443 (1993); BMW of N.A., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003).
14
See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Fostering Mutual Respect and Cooperation Between State Courts and
State Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to a Tort Tug of War, 103 W. Va. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Victor
Schwartz, Judicial Nullification of Tort Reform: Ignoring History, Logic, and Fundamentals of
Constitutional Law, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 688 (2001).
15
See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Judicial Nullification of Civil Justice Reform Violates the
Fundamental Federal Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers: How to Restore the Right
Balance, 32 Rutgers L.J. 907 (2001).
16
See Schwartz et al., Tort Reform Past, Present and Future, supra n. 1.
17
Id.
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issues of the day because they believe it may be advantageous to play on the
perceived inequities of more traditional tort reforms.
This article seeks to elicit debate on current issues by providing
some background on key reforms that are now a focus of state and federal
civil justice reform efforts. In particular, this article will discuss the trend
toward coordinated state attorney actions and reforms that are being
promoted to respond to this type of litigation. Next, this article will discuss
innovative model legislation to address excessive noneconomic damages
through heightened judicial review similar to that used in punitive damages
cases. Third, this article will discuss legislation that is gaining momentum
in the states to address the current “asbestos-litigation crisis”18 by
prioritizing claims so that sick claimants can have their claims heard more
expeditiously. This article also will discuss similar reforms that are being
pursued to prevent asbestos plaintiffs’ lawyers from re-styling their asbestos
claims as silica claims, as some lawyers have already done. Next, this
article will address efforts in the states to improve the function and
representativeness of the jury system. Lastly, the article will discuss a
current proposal at the federal level to address frivolous complaints and curb
forum-shopping abuse. These reforms demonstrate that the civil justice
reform landscape has changed in recent years. We invite debate on these
new issues and hope that this symposium can be a springboard for such
discussions.
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF COORDINATED STATE ATTORNEY LITIGATION

The coordinated state attorneys general litigation against tobacco
product manufacturers began a trend of government executive branch
officials partnering with private personal injury lawyers to sue legal, private
industries. Clinton Administration Secretary of Labor Robert Reich labeled
this practice “regulation through litigation.”19
In the state Medicaid recoupment lawsuits against tobacco
companies, the partnership between governments and private personal injury
lawyers was unprecedented—and lucrative. Ultimately, the litigation
resulted in settlements of approximately $243 billion in damages,20 with

_______________________________________________________
18

Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
Robert B. Reich, Regulation Is Out, Litigation Is In, USA Today A15 (Feb. 11, 1999) (stating that
“The era of big government may be over, but the era of regulation through litigation has just begun.”);
see also Michael I. Krauss, Regulation Masquerading As Judgment: Chaos Masquerading as Tort Law,
71 Miss. L.J. 631 (2001).
20
See Anthony J. Sebok, Pretext, Transparency and Motive in Mass Restitution Litigation, 57 Vand. L.
Rev. 2177 (2004); W. Kip Viscusi, The Governmental Composition of the Insurance Costs of Smoking,
19
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additional billions of dollars of contingency fees being paid to the attorneys
involved.21 The state official/trial lawyer alliance will no doubt continue
because government-sponsored lawsuits can regulate entire industries and
build the public coffers through awards and settlements that equate to tax
increases for businesses and are imposed outside of the democratic
process.22
In fact, while most attorneys general during the tobacco litigation
claimed that tobacco was a unique situation and that no lawsuits would be
brought against other industries, local governments soon hired private
attorneys to sue gun manufacturers in a large number of cities.23 A
Colorado writer has explained:
First there was the nicotine litigation . . . . Now there are
similar lawsuits against firearms manufacturers, filed by
large cities.
.

.

.

[T]he trend seems pretty clear here–if there’s a form of
social improvement that you can’t accomplish by the
normal legislative process, or is impeded by archaic
constitutional provisions like the Bill of Rights, then engage
some high-powered attorneys who know where to find deep
pockets for their contingency fees, and go for it.24
Rhode Island’s attorney general retained a veteran firm from the state
tobacco litigation to assist in an effort to hold former manufacturers of lead

42 J.L. & Econ. 575 (1999); W. Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 Cumb. L.
Rev. 523 (1999); Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political
Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco Litigation, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 1143, 1184 (2001).
21
The Hudson Institute estimated that the tobacco litigation settlement “will provide $500 million per
year to 200 to 300 lawyers—most probably in perpetuity.” John Fund & Martin Morse Wooster, The
Dangers of Regulation Through Litigation 9 (Am. Tort Reform Found. 2000) (quoting the Hudson
Institute’s Michael Horowitz).
22
See Walter K. Olson, Plaintiffs Lawyers Take Aim at Democracy, Wall St. J. A26 (Mar. 21, 2000);
Symposium, Jonathan Turley, A Crisis in Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37 Harv. J. on
Legis. 433 (2000); Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State
Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 Seton Hall L. Rev. 563 (2001).
23
See Jeff Reh, Social Issue Litigation and the Route Around Democracy, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 515
(2000).
24
Ed Quillen, Novel Litigation We Can Look Forward To, Denver Post. (Mar. 7, 1999) (available at
http://www.custerguide.com/quillen/eqcols/19993073.htm).
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paint liable for government healthcare costs.25 Several attorneys general
have tried coordinated litigation to force power companies to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions that allegedly contribute to global warming.26
Connecticut’s attorney general has solicited private attorneys for their
services in pursuing litigation against any company connected with the
manufacture, distribution, or sale of gasoline with Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (MTBE).27 A number of state attorneys general are pursuing actions
against pharmaceutical companies for prescription drug pricing practices.28
Reports suggest that other targets of attorneys general litigation could
include “HMOs, automobiles, chemicals, alcoholic beverages,
pharmaceuticals, Internet providers, ‘Hollywood,’ video game makers, and
even the dairy and fast food industries.”29
When attorneys general and state agencies work with private
attorneys—individuals with interests different from the state—the overall
benefit to the public becomes suspect at best. As Secretary Reich, who
coined the phrase “regulation by litigation,” has sagely observed: “The
strategy may work, but at the cost of making our frail democracy even
weaker. . . . This is faux legislation, which sacrifices democracy to the

_______________________________________________________
25

See Bonnie Campbell, Hiring Contingent-Fee Lawyers to Bring Public Lawsuits Only Looks Like
Justice On the Cheap, 26:33 Legal Times 60 (Aug. 18, 2003); R.I., DuPont Reach Deal on Lead Paint,
Providence J.-Bull. A1 (July 1, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR 10538139); Kara Sissell, DuPont to Pay
$12 Million to Settle Lead Paint Suit, 167:23 Chem. Wk. 41 (July 13, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR
11820948); Editorial, Paint by Lawyer, Wall St. J., A20 (Nov. 7, 2005).
26
See Michael I. Krauss & S. Fred Singer, Pseudo-Tort Alert!, Wall St. J. A10 (Aug. 3, 2004); C.
Boyden Gray, Democracy At Home, 9 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 205 (2005); Jeff Nesmith, Emissions Suits
Against Utilities Dismissed, Atlanta J.-Const. G4 (Sept. 16, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR 14628862).
27
See State of Connecticut, Attorney General’s Office, Request for Proposals: Litigation Services
Involving Compensatory and Punitive Damages and Injunctive Relief Against Manufacturers, Designers,
Refiners, Distributors, and Sellers of Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) for Pollution and
Contamination of the Waters of the State of Connecticut, RFP No. 04-01 (MTBE), Feb. 25, 2004
(available at http://www.cslib.org/ attygenl/hottopics/mtbe%20rfp.pdf).
28
See David S. Nalven, Prescription Drug Litigation: Seeking Reform Through the Courts, 49-Feb. B.
B.J. 18 (2005); Guy Boulton, Scrutiny of Drug Companies Expands: State Is One of Many to File
Lawsuits, Launch Investigations, Milwaukee J. Sentinel 1 (July 10, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR
11346409); Texas Goes After Big Pharma, 97:5 Tex. Observer 6 (Mar. 4, 2005) (available at 2005
WLNR 8739160); William Hathaway, State Sues Drug Companies, Claiming Price Gouging, Hartford
Courant B7 (Mar. 14, 2003); Russell Gold & Andrew Caffrey, States Suing Drug Makers Spurn Former
Allies on Tobacco, Wall St. J. B1 (May 29, 2002).
29
Schwartz et al., Tort Reform Past, Present and Future, supra n. 1, at 258; see also Matthew T.
Salzmann, More Than A Fat Chance For Lard Litigation: The Viability of State Medicaid
Reimbursement Actions, 56 Rutgers L. Rev. 1039 (2004); John J. Zefutie, Jr., From Butts to Big Macs—
Can The Big Tobacco Litigation and Nation-wide Settlement With States’ Attorneys General Service as a
Model for Attacking the Fast Food Industry?, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1383 (2004); Bryce A. Jensen, From
Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond—A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86
Cornell L. Rev. 1334 (2001).
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discretion of administration officials operating in secrecy.”30
A.

What Can Be Done?

1.

Legislation to Require Open and Competitive Bidding

Too often, as Secretary Reich suggested, the fee agreements
between public officials and private contingency fee lawyers are made
behind closed doors without a competitive bidding process. Because there
is no public oversight, the attorney selection process can be abused for
personal gain and political patronage.31 Lack of disclosure and legislative
oversight also can leave the public with a perception that attorneys are hired
by the state primarily based on their connections, and not all attorneys have
a fair opportunity to compete. Perception can become reality, and the public
may lose faith in government. Rules should be adopted to require open and
competitive bidding and greater public oversight in government retention of
private legal services.32
In most jurisdictions, when government entities contract for goods
and services, the bidding generally is done through an open and competitive
process. Federal and state sunshine laws ensure that these transactions are
above board and result in the best use of taxpayer dollars. In the state
Medicaid recoupment lawsuits against tobacco companies, however, many
state attorneys general disregarded such practices and, instead, negotiated
contingent fee contracts—behind closed doors—with hand-picked private
personal injury lawyers. These contracts stipulated that in lieu of a flat or
hourly fee, the private lawyers were guaranteed a percentage of any trial
judgment or settlement. Some contingency fee personal injury lawyers have
earned astronomical fees as a result of their contracts with states—

_______________________________________________________
30
Robert B. Reich, Don’t Democrats Believe in Democracy?, Wall St. J. A22 (Jan. 12, 2000); see also
Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule of Law, 22 S. Ill. U. L.J. 601
(1998); Charles Christopher Harris, State Tobacco Settlement: A Windfall of Problems, 17 J.L. & Pol.
167 (2001); Ed Dawson, Legigation, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1727 (2001).
31
One New York antitrust lawyer who has worked with and against state attorneys general has explained:
“The state AGs are elected, and the trial lawyers are heavy contributors . . . . It’s a dangerous circle
when the trial bar supports activist AGs who by being activist AGs support the work of the trial lawyers.”
Jenny Anderson, New Cops on the Beat; State Attorneys General Are No Longer Simply Chasing
Telemarketers and Cross-Border Pyramid Schemes. They Are Taking on Global Giants, from Wall
Street to the Pharmaceuticals Industry, and Business is Complaining, 36:7 Inst. Inv. 77 (July 1, 2002)
(available at 2002 WLNR 10787251).
32
See e.g. Brooke Jones Bacak, The Case for Regulation of Private Attorney Retention by the State of
Alabama, 29 J. Legal Prof. 179 (2004-2005).
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sometimes amounts equal to as much as $105,022 an hour per lawyer!33
The practice of hiring private attorneys to handle coordinate state
attorneys general litigation raises troubling questions and creates several
fundamental public policy problems.
First, governments and private contingency fee attorneys are guided
by conflicting goals and principles. Attorneys general take oaths to the
United States Constitution and the constitutions of their states. Their
overriding duty is to impartially serve the best interests of the public. As the
United States Supreme Court has explained, an attorney for the state “is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all.”34 In contrast, private contingency fee personal injury
attorneys are motivated by profit. Thus, the personal injury lawyers’
inclination is to push the law into new and uncharted territory to obtain the
maximum recovery—regardless of whether the legal principles advocated
benefit society as a whole.
Second, the public official/private attorney alliance creates a strong
potential for the appearance of impropriety. Kansas serves as an apt
illustration of this problem. In 1996, then Attorney General Carla Stovall
hired her former law partners at Entz & Chanay to serve as local counsel in
Kansas’s tobacco lawsuit without the benefit of competitive bidding.35 In
addition to accepting the case that resulted in a jackpot fee award, Entz &
Chanay’s basement housed Ms. Stovall’s campaign. Entz & Chanay also
contributed money to her campaign effort.36
Texas serves as another example. In 1996, then Texas Attorney
General Dan Morales hired five firms to file his state’s tobacco litigation.37
Four of these firms together had contributed nearly $150,000 in campaign
contributions to Morales from 1990 to 1995.38 The tobacco settlement

_______________________________________________________
33
Robert A. Levy, The Great Tobacco Robbery: Hired Guns Corral Contingent Fee Bonanza, Legal
Times 27 (Feb. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Levy, Tobacco Robbery].
34
Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
35
See Mark A. Behrens & Donald Kochan, Let the Sunshine In: The Need for Open, Competitive Bidding
in Government Retention of Private Legal Services, 28:38 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rptr. (BNA) 915, 915
(Oct. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Behrens & Kochan, Let the Sunshine In].
36
See John L. Petterson, Payment for Law Firm Draws Fire; Hearing Continues in Case Involving
Tobacco Litigation, Kansas City Star B3 (Feb. 17, 2000).
37
See Editorial, $30,000 An Hour, Wall St. J., July 5, 2000, at A22.
38
See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Secret Government Deals With Private Lawyers: Opportunities
for Fraud and Abuse, 18:9 Leader’s Prod. Liab. L. & Strategy 1 (Mar. 2000) (citing Levy, Tobacco
Robbery, supra n. 33, at 27).
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awarded the lawyers fifteen percent of the state’s $15.3 billion recovery—
about $2.3 billion, which was increased by an arbitration panel adjudicating
the fee dispute to $3.3 billion.39 When calculated over the time spent on the
project, the lawyers in Texas were paid over $92,000 per hour.40 Such
blatant preferential treatment by Morales of firms that supported him
politically creates, at the very least, the appearance of impropriety.
In Washington state, after Jon Ferguson, senior counsel of the
antitrust section of the Washington attorney general, and Steve Berman of
the Chandler, Franklin & O’Bryan firm led Washington’s lucrative lawsuit
against the tobacco companies, Ferguson announced that he was leaving his
post to join Berman’s firm to work on a class action against the tobacco
industry.41 When asked why he was leaving his post to go work for the firm
that handled the state’s case, Ferguson explained: “Steve Berman got
$50 million and I got a plaque.”42 Apparently, Ferguson also had a job
waiting for him at the firm.
Third, even in cases where contingency fee contracts are
legitimately negotiated, private agreements between contingency fee
lawyers and attorneys general may not result in the selection of the best
person at the best cost. Once again, Kansas serves as an example.
General Stovall’s selection of her former firm was at the expense of another
Kansas firm, Hutton & Hutton, which specializes in large product liability
cases.43 Hutton & Hutton criticized Entz & Chanay’s handling of the
Kansas suit and claimed that they could have recovered an additional $1
billion for Kansas.44 If so, that is something that might be avoided in the
future if contracts for government-sponsored lawsuits are subject to open
and competitive bidding.
Finally, the deals between attorneys general and private personal
injury lawyers have spawned bitter fee disputes.45 These controversies force
government officials to waste taxpayer dollars, divert their attention from

_______________________________________________________
39

Id.
David Edward Dahlquist, Inherent Conflict: A Case Against the Use of Contingency Fees By Special
Assistants In Quasi-Governmental Prosecutorial Roles, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 743, 777 (2000).
41
See Behrens & Kochan, Let the Sunshine In, supra n. 35, at 916.
42
Id.
43
See Jim McLean, Wichita Firm: Snub Cost $1 Billion, Topeka Capital-J. A1 (Feb. 18, 2000).
44
Id.
45
See Levy, Tobacco Robbery, supra n. 35, at 29; Editorial, $30,000 an Hour, Wall St. J. A22 (July 5,
2000).
40
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other matters, or engage in unnecessary litigation. The potential for such
costly fee disputes would be reduced if attorney fee agreements were made
with greater public oversight.46
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), the nation’s
largest nonpartisan membership organization of state legislators, has
developed model legislation called the Private Attorney Retention Sunshine
Act to address these problems.47 First, the Act requires open and
competitive bidding before the attorney general or any state agency that
retains private attorneys to represent the state.48 Second, the Act would
provide for legislative oversight when the attorney general or any state
agency seeks to enter a contract for private legal services with legal costs
that are expected to exceed $1 million.49 Third, the Act would require that
when a state agency contracts with contingent fee attorneys to work on
state’s behalf, the private attorneys must keep a record of the time spent on
the state’s behalf.50 At the conclusion of the case, the attorney would be
required to provide the agency with a statement of the hours worked,
expenses incurred, the aggregate fee amount, and a breakdown as to the
hourly rate (based on hours worked for the amount recovered, less
expenses).51 This provision would give the state the means to determine
whether the taxpayers received a fair deal or whether the private attorneys
received an extraordinary and unreasonable fee.52 Finally, the Act would
limit the amount of the fee that could be charged to an amount equivalent to
$1,000 per hour.53
Legislation based on ALEC’s model Act has been enacted in
Colorado,54 Connecticut,55 Kansas,56 Minnesota,57 North Dakota,58 Texas,59

_______________________________________________________
46
See Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77 Temp. L. Rev.
825, 910 (2004).
47
See Hon. Don Stenberg, States Disserve the Public Interest When Hiring Contingent Fee Lawyers,

Legal Backgrounder, Vol. 18, No. 24 (Washington Legal Found. June 20, 2003).
48

See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Private Attorney Retention Sunshine Act (approved by ALEC Bd. of

Dirs. Sept. 1998).
49

See id.

50

See id.

51

See id.

52

See id.

53

See id.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-17-301 to 304 (West 2005).
55
Conn. H. 7502, 2005 Leg., June Spec. Sess. (2005).
56
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-37, 130 to 135 (Supp. 2005).
57
Minn. H. File 1481, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2005).
58
N.D. Cent. Code § 54-12-08.1 (2001).
59
Tex. Govt. Code Ann. §§ 404.097, 2254.101 (2005).
54
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and Virginia.60 The legislation has been successful; and, in the years since it
was first enacted, there have been no reports of attorneys general or other
state agencies having difficulty procuring private legal services.
2.

Appeal Bond Reform

Appeal bonds provide security that a civil defendant who suffers an
adverse judgment at trial will have assets sufficient to satisfy the judgment if
efforts to challenge the verdict on appeal prove to be unsuccessful. Thus, a
defendant facing a multi-million dollar judgment may have to post an
enormous bond (equal to the amount of the judgment plus costs and interest)
in order to be able to prevent the plaintiff from seizing its assets while it
appeals.
The appeal bond statutes in many states are outdated and in need of
reform.61 They were adopted when judgments were generally more
reasonable in scale—before the creation of novel and expansive theories of
liability and before the emergence of government-sponsored lawsuits and
class actions that aim to reach deep into the pockets of corporate defendants.
In this day of increasingly massive verdicts, the current bonding requirement
in some states can force a defendant into bankruptcy before it can have its
day in an appellate court. This obviously has terrible implications for the
defendant, its workers, and shareholders. In addition, the potential for
appeal bond requirements to stand as a roadblock to appellate review raises
constitutional concerns.
The problem of oppressive bonding requirements first became
evident during the state attorneys general litigation against the tobacco
industry. As one law professor has observed, “[I]f multi-billion dollar
judgments had been entered against the tobacco manufacturers in the states’
lawsuits, the manufacturers likely would have lacked the resources to
immediately pay the judgments (or even post an appeal bond), and may have
been forced into bankruptcy.”62
Civil defendants should have full access to a state’s appellate court

_______________________________________________________
60

Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-510.1 (2005).
See Mark A. Behrens & Donald Kochan, Protecting the Right to Appellate Review in the New Era of
Civil Actions: A Call for Bonding Fairness, 2:17 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) 644 (Sept. 14, 2001),
also printed in 29:21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rptr. (BNA) 515 (May 21, 2001).
62
Richard L. Cupp, State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the Domino Effect For
Lead Paint Manufacturers And Others Fair Game?, 27 Pepp. L. Rev. 685, 689-90 (2000).
61
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system to challenge an adverse judgment—just as losing plaintiffs should
have the ability to test their case on appeal. The defendants’ right to an
appeal is particularly important if the verdict contradicts settled legal
principles, is based on novel and untested legal theories, is the product of
bias or prejudice, or is so large as to violate constitutional due process
protections.
Picture the following scenario. A state executive brings a lawsuit
against an unpopular out-of-state corporation. The trial judge allows the
case to proceed based on a novel legal theory. Prejudicial and inflammatory
evidence is paraded before the jury. The jury returns an unconstitutionally
excessive punitive damages verdict. If the defendant cannot post the bond,
there is nothing it can do to reverse the plainly erroneous and
unconstitutional judgment. The defendant’s right to an appeal is effectively
blocked. Ironically, the more egregious the errors at trial, and the more
outrageous the award, the more likely it is that the defendant will be unable
to post a bond sufficient for the judgment to be appealed. The very cases
that cry out for appellate review are the ones that a defendant may not be
able to appeal. That result is unfair and wrong.
There is only one way for a defendant to avoid this fate, and it is
equally disturbing—the defendant must settle, even if it believes the case is
flimsy or without merit. As if to add insult to injury, the defendant will
most likely be forced to settle on unfavorable terms and pay a premium
because it has been placed over a barrel. The defendant either accepts the
plaintiffs’ terms or risks bankruptcy. Bonding statutes can, therefore, be
abused as a tool to facilitate legal extortion.
Recognizing this problem, ALEC has proposed sound and fair
model legislation to protect the right to an appeal in civil cases. ALEC’s
Appeal Bond Waiver Act would waive the appeal bond requirement as to
that portion of the judgment that exceeds $25 million if the defendant is a
larger business.63 If the defendant is a smaller business (i.e., the defendant
has fifty or fewer employees and annual revenues of $5 million or less), the
appeal bond requirement would be waived for that portion of the judgment
that exceeds $1 million.64 The bill in no way limits the amount of damages
that can be imposed in litigation. The Act is merely intended to ensure that
a defendant can appeal a massive judgment without being put out of

_______________________________________________________
63

See, Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Appeal Bond Waiver Act (approved by ALEC Bd. of Dirs. Jan. 2006,

as amended).
64

See id.
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business by a plaintiff who seeks to execute on that judgment.
A majority of jurisdictions have now enacted legislation or changed
court rules to limit the size of the bond requirement in cases involving large
judgments.65 Some of the reforms that have been adopted apply to all civil
defendants,66 while others are limited to cases involving signatories to the
state attorneys general tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, generally
including their successors and affiliates.67 Some appeal bond reforms that

_______________________________________________________
65

Six jurisdictions do not require defendants to post a bond at all during an appeal: Connecticut (Conn.
R. App. P. § 61-11), Maine (Me. R. Civ. P. 62), Massachusetts (Mass. R. Civ. P. 62(d)), New Hampshire
(N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527:1), Vermont (Vt. R. Civ. P. 62(d)(1)) or Puerto Rico (P.R. R. Civ. P. 53.9).
66
See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-214 (2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $25 million bond cap); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-16-12 (2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $25 million bond cap); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 768.733 (West 2005) (applies to class action defendants; $100 million bond cap); Ga. Code Ann. § 5-646 (1995 & Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $25 million bond cap); Idaho Code § 13-202
(2004) (applies to punitive damages only; $1 million bond cap); Ind. Code. Ann. § 34-49-5-3 (West
Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $25 million bond cap); Iowa Code Ann. § 625A.9 (West
1999 & Supp. 2005) (applies to money judgments; $100 million bond cap); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 205.1
(West 2001) (applies to punitive damages portion of a judgment; $100 million bond cap)(repealed);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2607(1) (West Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $25 million
bond cap); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 550.36 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $150
million bond cap); Miss. R. App. P. 8 (applies to the punitive damages portion of a judgment; bond
capped at the lesser of 125 percent of the judgment, 10 percent of the defendant’s net worth, or $100
million); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1916 (2005) (applies to all civil judgments; bond capped at the lesser of
the amount of the judgment, 50 percent of defendant’s net worth, or $50 million); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1289 (2003) (applies to money judgments; $25 million bond cap); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2505.09 (West
2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $50 million bond cap); S.D. Sup. Ct. Rule 03-13 (applies to money
judgments; $25 million bond cap); Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-124 (Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil
judgments; $75 million bond cap); Tex. Civ. P. & Rem. § 52.006(b) (2005) (applies to money judgments;
bond capped at the lesser of 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth or $25 million); Va. Code
Ann. § 8.01-676.1 J (2000 & Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $25 million bond cap); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 808.07 (West 1994 & Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $100 million bond cap).
67
Ala. H.B. 220, 2006 Reg. Sess. (applies to all civil judgments; $125 million bond cap); Cal. Health &
Safety Code § 104558 (West 1996 & Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil judgments; bond capped at the
lesser of 100 percent of the judgment or $150 million); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.733 (applies to all civil
judgments; $100 million bond cap); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 328L-7 (LEXIS 1993 & Supp. 2004)
(applies to all civil judgments; $150 million bond cap); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-6a05 (West Supp. 2004)
(applies to all civil judgments; $25 million bond cap); La. Stat. Ann. § 98.6 (2005) (applies to all money
judgments; $50 million bond cap); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 512.085 (West Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil
judgments; $50 million bond cap); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 20.035.1 (amended by 2005 Nev. Laws Ch. 138
(A.B. 486)) (applies to all civil judgments; $50 million bond cap); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:4D-13 (Supp.
2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $50 million bond cap); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 990.4 B.5 (West
Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $25 million bond cap); 2003 Or. Laws 804 (not yet codified)
(applies to all civil judgments; $150 million bond cap); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 5701.309 (West Supp.
2005) (applies to all civil judgments; $100 million bond cap); S.C. Code Ann. § 18-9-130 (1985 & Supp.
2004) (applies to all forms of civil judgments; automatic stay—no bond required); W. Va. Code § 4-11
A-4 (2002 & Supp. 2005) (applies to all civil litigation and provides that consolidated or aggregated
cases shall be treated as a single judgment for purposes of the appeal bond limits; $100 million bond cap
for all portions of a judgment other than punitive damages; $100 million bond cap for the punitive
damages portion of judgment).
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have been adopted apply to total damages, while some limit the bonding
requirement only for the punitive damages portion of the judgment. These
reforms are supported by due process and equal protection principles. As
the United States Supreme Court has explained in another context, “The
right to appeal would be unique among state actions if it could be withdrawn
without consideration of applicable due process norms.”68 Bonding
requirements that make it impossible to pursue an appeal are, therefore,
constitutionally defective as a matter of due process. Similarly, bonding
requirements may run afoul of equal protection guarantees by creating a
system that treats defendants “differently for purposes of offering them a
meaningful appeal” based on their ability to post a bond without going
bankrupt.69 Appeal bond reforms can help ensure that a lack of resources
will not result in a denial of these fundamental constitutional safeguards.
III.

FULL & FAIR NONECONOMIC DAMAGES ACT

Windfall compensatory awards, namely pain and suffering, are an
emerging concern for civil defendants. “This trend toward excessive pain
and suffering awards appears to be in response to efforts by the Supreme
Court of the United States to rein in ‘grossly excessive’ punitive awards”70
and state statutes that restrict the availability and amount of such awards.71
Perhaps most importantly, as a practical matter, judges at both the trial and
appellate level have more vigorously used their inherent power to reduce
large awards. As a result of these initiatives, while multi-million and billion dollar punitive awards are still common, punitive damages, in
general, no longer operate under an anything goes standard.
Similar to punitive damages, pain and suffering awards are
inherently subjective. “Juries are left with nothing but their consciences to
guide them.”72 As one group of commentators noted, “Courts have usually
been content to say that pain and suffering damages should amount to ‘fair
compensation’ or a ‘reasonable amount,’ without any more definite
guide.”73 Absent a finding that the award shocks the conscience, courts
often uphold such awards with little more than cursory review.

_______________________________________________________
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Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 400-01 (1985).
Id. at 405 (discussing cases involving indigent defendants that are denied an appeal (for example,
because they are unable to afford a transcript) in violation of equal protection and due process).
70
Hantler et al., supra n. 3, at 1130.
71
See Schwartz et al., Reining In Punitive Damages “Run Wild,” supra n. 4.
72
Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 772, 778 (1985).
73
Randall J. Bovberg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering, 83 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 908, 912 (1989).
69

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol31/iss2/2

2006]

THE EVOLVING CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM MOVEMENT

187

This hands-off approach creates the opportunity for manipulation of
the system by using the defendant’s supposed bad acts to augment pain and
suffering awards.74 Without proper oversight by the court, the jury can be
directed away from the plaintiff and toward the wrongdoing of the defendant
by a carefully constructed maze of guilt evidence. As a result, the
fundamental purpose of pain and suffering awards—to compensate the
plaintiff—is upended. The defendant is punished, but the award is not
subject to the extensive legal controls that help assure that punitive awards
do not cross the constitutional line.
In addition, inflated pain and suffering awards can be used to justify
higher punitive damages than would otherwise be constitutionally
permissible. For example, if the underlying compensatory damages result
from an inflated pain and suffering award, this would then allow a punitive
award that is a multiple of the already overstated compensatory damages.
Thus, when a pain and suffering award improperly results from
consideration of wrongful conduct, the error may be further exacerbated
through a redundant and constitutionally excessive punitive damage award.
ALEC has developed a model Full & Fair Noneconomic Damages
Act to ensure that pain and suffering awards serve their true compensatory
purpose.75 The model Act would prohibit consideration of guilt evidence
when a jury determines an award for pain and suffering.76 The jury would
be instructed that the law requires them to consider only what it would take
to compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering.77 Jurors would be told
that they are not to consider any alleged wrongdoing, misconduct, guilt, the
defendant’s wealth, or any other evidence that is offered for the purpose of
punishment when they are determining noneconomic damages.
The Act also requires a trial court to closely review pain and
suffering awards during the post-trial phase.78 First, the judge would
consider whether the facts of the case or the arguments of counsel inflamed

_______________________________________________________
74
See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards: Turning
Compensation Into "Punishment,” 54 S.C. L. Rev. 47 (2002).
75
See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, New Model Bill to Address Inflated Non-Economic Damage
Awards, ALEC Issue Analysis (Am. Legis. Exch. Council July 2004).
76
See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Full & Fair Noneconomic Damages Act (approved by ALEC Bd. of

Dirs. Aug. 2004)
77

See id.

78

See id.
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the passion or prejudice of the jury, including whether the jury improperly
considered the wealth of the defendant.79 Next, the judge would consider
the amount of the pain and suffering award relative to the severity of any
physical injury and the amount of any economic loss.80 Finally, the judge
would take into account whether the noneconomic damage award is in
excess of verdicts involving comparable injuries to similarly situated
plaintiffs.81 If so, the court could uphold the award if it finds extraordinary
circumstances in the record to support an award in excess of the amount
awarded in similar cases.
Finally, the Act requires appellate courts to engage in a de novo
review of an appeal of a noneconomic damages award challenged on
grounds of excessiveness.82 This means that the appellate court would
independently consider the legality of the noneconomic damage award,
rather than rely on the judgment of the trial court absent finding an abuse of
discretion.83 This de novo standard is the same type of thorough review
mandated by the United States Supreme Court for determining whether a
punitive damage award is unconstitutionally excessive.84
IV.

ASBESTOS AND SILICA MEDICAL CRITERIA REFORM

A.

The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: An Overview

When asbestos product liability lawsuits emerged almost thirty
years ago, nobody could have predicted that courts today would be facing an
ever growing “asbestos-litigation crisis.”85 Instead of easing, “[t]he crisis is

_______________________________________________________
79

See id.

80

See id.
Courts have successfully used this comparative approach to incorporate an objective element into the
review of noneconomic damage awards, a practice that is supported by legal scholars. See David Baldus
et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative
Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev.
1109, 1134-35 (1995) (noting that the comparative approach is most widely practiced for the review of
general damage awards in New York); David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and
Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 256, 323 (1989) (“It is not enough for reviewing judges
simply to ask whether the specific factual circumstances of the award justify a particularly large award.
They must also ask whether the facts indicate that the plaintiff has suffered sufficiently more than
similarly situated plaintiffs to justify an award larger than other juries or judges have granted.”); Oscar G.
Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. 763, 777 (1995)
(proposing that jurors in all cases in which non-pecuniary damages are sought receive a grid of the
median, high, and low awards in similar cases in the same state during a contemporaneous time period to
avoid extraordinary awards and the need for appellate review).
82
See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Full & Fair Noneconomic Damages Act, supra, n. 76.
81

83

See id.
See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001).
85
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597.
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worsening at a much more rapid pace than even the most pessimistic
projections.”86 At least 322,000 asbestos claims are now pending.87
Today, the vast majority of new asbestos claimants—up to ninety
percent—are “people who have been exposed to asbestos, and who (usually)
have some marker of exposure such as changes in the pleural membrane
covering the lungs, but who are not impaired by an asbestos-related disease
and likely never will be.”88 Mass screenings conducted by plaintiffs’
lawyers and their agents have “driven the flow of new asbestos claims by
healthy plaintiffs.”89 These screenings are frequently conducted in areas
with high concentrations of workers that may have worked in jobs where
they were exposed to asbestos.90
Plaintiffs are recruited through
exaggerated ads, such as: “Find out if YOU have MILLION DOLLAR
LUNGS!”91
The active and retired [union] members of [asbestosaffected industries] crafts are notified through their
newsletters and through meetings of retired employees that
mobile vans or temporary offices equipped with X-ray
machines are available to screen those with a history of
asbestos exposure. The X-rays in turn are then viewed by
radiologists for any abnormalities.

_______________________________________________________
86

Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership: The Courts’ Duty to Help Solve The
Asbestos Litigation Crisis, 6:6 Briefly 7 (Natl. Leg. Ctr. for the Pub. Interest June 2002); see also
Stephen J. Carroll et al., Asbestos Litigation xxiv, RAND Inst. for Civ. Just. (2005) (“The number of
claims filed annually has increased sharply in the past few years.”) [hereinafter RAND Rep.].
87
See Am Acad. of Actuaries, Current Issues in Asbestos Litigation (Feb. 2006), (available at
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/asbetos_feb06.pdf) [hereinafter Am. Acad. of Actuaries Rep.].
88
H.R. Jud. Comm., The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1283, 106th
Cong. 5 (July 1, 1999) (statement of Christopher Edley, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School) (available at
1999 WL 458254); see also Roger Parloff, Asbestos, Fortune 186 (Sept. 6, 2004) (available at 2004
WLNR 17888598) (“According to estimates accepted by the most experienced federal judges in this area,
two-thirds to 90% of the nonmalignants are ‘unimpaireds’—that is, they have slight or no physical
symptoms.”); RAND Rep., supra n. 86, at 76 (“[A] large and growing proportion of the claims entering
the system in recent years were submitted by individuals who had not at the time of filing suffered an
injury that had as yet affected their ability to perform the activities of daily living.”); Alex Berenson, A
Surge in Asbestos Suits, Many by Healthy Plaintiffs, N.Y. Times A15 (Apr. 10, 2002) (available at 2002
WLNR 4092639).
89
Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos & The Sleeping Constitution, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2003); see also
Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnnect Between
Scholarship and Reality?, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 33 (2003); Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos
Litigation, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 833 (2005).
90
See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Am. Employers’ Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (D. Mass. 1989).
91
Pamela Sherrid, Looking for Some Million Dollar Lungs, U.S. News & World Rep. 36 (Dec. 17, 2001).
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At the initial screening, representatives associated
with the national counsel of the various unions are present
and distribute brochures advising both retired and still
working employees of their legal remedies. Retainer
agreements are often obtained on the spot.
After initial screenings, those with anything other
than normal X-rays are called in for a second examination
which may include more chest X-rays, CT scans, pulmonary
function tests and a clinical examination. A more detailed
history of asbestos exposure is also obtained. If abnormal
findings consistent with asbestos exposure are again
demonstrated, a lawsuit is usually filed.92
Some attorneys reportedly pass an x-ray around to numerous radiologists
until they find one who is willing to say that the x-ray shows symptoms of
an asbestos-related disease, a practice strongly suggesting unreliable
scientific evidence.93 Many of the x-ray interpreters (B-readers) are “so
biased that their readings [are] simply unreliable.”94 As one physician has
explained, “[T]he chest x-rays are not read blindly, but always with
knowledge of some asbestos exposure and that the lawyer wants to file
litigation on the worker’s behalf.”95 “The result is the epidemic of
asbestosis observed . . . in numbers which are inconceivable and among
industries where the disease has never been previously recognized by
medical investigation.”96

_______________________________________________________
92

John C. Corrigan & Craig J. Whitney, Asbestos Litigation Under the F.E.L.A., 20 Forum 580 (Summer
1985). For a thorough discussion of screening practices, see Judyth Pendell, Regulating AttorneyFunded Mass Medical Screenings: A Public Health Imperative?, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies (Sept. 2005),
http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=993
[hereinafter Pendell].
93
See David Egilman, Asbestos Screenings, 42 Am. J. of Indus. Med. 163 (2002); see also Stephen
Hudak & John F. Hagan, Asbestos Litigation Overwhelms Courts, Cleveland Plain Dealer 1 (Nov. 5,
2002) (available at 2002 WLNR 269888) (reporting that one expert medical witness for plaintiffs
remarked, “I was amazed to discover that, in some of the screenings, the worker’s x-ray had been
‘shopped around’ to as many as six radiologists until a slightly positive reading was reported by the last
one.”).
94
Owens Corning v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 322 B.R. 719, 723 (D. Del. 2005).
95
David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 11, 13 (2003)
(quoting Lawrence Martin, M.D.). In 2004, researchers at Johns Hopkins University re-evaluated 551 xrays and 492 matching interpretive reports used as a basis for an asbestos claim. The x-ray readers who
had been retained by plaintiffs’ lawyers found that 95.9% of the films revealed abnormalities. When six
independent radiologists reinterpreted the x-rays, they found abnormalities in only 4.5% of the cases.
See Joseph N. Gitlin et al., Comparison of “B” Readers’ Interpretations of Chest Radiographs for
Asbestos Related Changes, 11 Acad. Radiology 843 (2004).
96
Andrew J. Ghio, M.D., Asbestosis: Over Diagnosed?, News & Observer (Charlotte, N.C.) A11 (Apr.
12, 2004).
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The problem presented by mass filings by unimpaired claimants is
self-evident: they create judicial backlogs and exhaust scarce resources that
should go to “the sick and dying, their widows and survivors.”97 Sick
plaintiffs and asymptomatic claimants are forced to compete against each
other for scarce resources.98 The former manager of the federal asbestos
docket explained: “Only a very small percentage of the cases filed have
serious asbestos-related afflictions, but they are prone to be lost in the
shuffle with pleural and other non-malignancy cases.”99
Lawyers who represent cancer victims have been highly critical of
mass screenings and the filings they generate. Here is what some of these
lawyers have said:
•

Matthew Bergman of Seattle: “Victims of
mesothelioma, the most deadly form of asbestos-related
illness, suffer the most from the current system . . . .
[T]he genuinely sick and dying are often deprived of
adequate compensation as more and more funds are
diverted into settlements of the non-impaired claims.”100

•

Peter Kraus of Dallas: Plaintiffs’ lawyers who file suits
on behalf of the non-sick are “sucking the money away
from the truly impaired.”101

•

Steve Kazan of Oakland, California has testified that
recoveries by the unimpaired may result in his clients
being left uncompensated.102

_______________________________________________________
97

In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Collins v. Mac-Millan Bloedel,
Inc., 532 U.S. 1066 (2001) (internal citation omitted).
98
See In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 751 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(“Overhanging this massive failure of the present system is the reality that there is not enough money
available from traditional defendants to pay for current and future claims. Even the most conservative
estimates of future claims, if realistically estimated on the books of many present defendants, would lead
to a declaration of insolvency—as in the case of some dozen manufacturers already in bankruptcy.”),
vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
99
In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 1996 WL 539589, *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1996).
100
Matthew Bergman & Jackson Schmidt, Editorial, Change Rules on Asbestos Lawsuits, Seattle PostIntelligencer B7 (May 30, 2002) (available at 2002 WLNR 2149929).
101
Susan Warren, Competing Claims: As Asbestos Mess Spreads, Sickest See Payouts Shrink, Wall St. J.
A1 (Apr. 25, 2002).
102
See Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Jud., 107th Cong. (Mar. 5, 2003)
(statement of Steven Kazan, partner, Kazan, McClain, Edises, Abrams, Fernandez, Lyons & Farrise)
(available at 2003 WL 785389).
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Terrence Lavin, an Illinois State Bar President and
Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyer: “Members of the asbestos
bar have made a mockery of our civil justice system and
have inflicted financial ruin on corporate America by
representing people with nothing more than an arguable
finding on an x-ray.”103

The concerns of the asbestos cancer lawyers are well founded.
Asbestos litigation has forced at least seventy-eight employers into
bankruptcy.104 The RAND Institute for Civil Justice (RAND) reported that
“[f]ollowing 1976, the year of the first bankruptcy attributed to asbestos
litigation, 19 bankruptcies were filed in the 1980s and 17 in the 1990s.
Between 2000 and mid-2004, there were 36 bankruptcy filings, more than in
either of the prior two decades.”105 The “process is accelerating,”106 due to
the “piling on” nature of asbestos liabilities.107 A study by Columbia
University Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and two
colleagues found that bankruptcies resulting from asbestos litigation put up
to 60,000 people out of work between 1997 and 2000.108 Those workers and
their families lost $175 million to $200 million in wages,109 and employee
retirement assets declined roughly twenty-five percent.110
As a result of these bankruptcies, “the net has spread from the
asbestos makers to companies far removed from the scene of any putative
wrongdoing.”111 Plaintiffs’ attorney Richard Scruggs has remarked that the
litigation has turned into the “endless search for a solvent bystander.”112

_______________________________________________________
103

Editorial, ABA Backs Asbestos Reform, Wash. Times B2 (Feb. 16, 2003).
See Am. Acad. of Actuaries Rep., supra n. 87, at Attachment 3, Sheet 1.
105
RAND Rep., supra n. 86, at xxvii.; see also Ronald Barliant, Dimitri G. Karcazes & Anne M. Sherry,
From Free-Fall To Free-For-All: The Rise of Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst.
L. Rev. 441 (2004); Mark D. Plevin et al., Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44
S. Tex. L. Rev. 883 (2003).
106
In re Collins, 233 F.3d at 812.
107
See Christopher Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis, 30 Harv. J. on
Legis. 383, 392 (1993) (stating that each time a defendant declares bankruptcy, “mounting and
cumulative” financial pressure is placed on the “remaining defendants, whose resources are limited.”); In
re Combustion Engr., Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 2005) (“For some time now, mounting asbestos
liabilities have pushed otherwise viable companies into bankruptcy.”).
108
See Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., The Impact of Asbestos Liabilities on Workers in Bankrupt Firms, 12 J.
Bankr. L. & Prac. 51 (2003).
109
See id. at 76.
110
See id. at 83.
111
Editorial, Lawyers Torch the Economy, Wall St. J. A14 (Apr. 6, 2001); see also U.S. Cong., Cong.
Budget Off., The Economics of U.S. Tort Liability: A Primer 8 (Oct. 2003) (stating that asbestos suits
have expanded “from the original manufacturers of asbestos-related products to include customers who
may have used those products in their facilities”).
112
‘Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation’—A Discussion with Richard Scruggs and Victor
Schwartz, 17:3 Mealey’s Litig. Rep.: Asbestos 5 (Mar. 1, 2002).
104
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More than 8,500 defendants113 have become “ensnarled in the litigation.”114
Many of these defendants are familiar names.115 Other defendants are small
businesses facing potentially devastating liability.116
Nontraditional
defendants now account for more than half of asbestos expenditures.117
B.

Rise in Silica-Related Lawsuits

For years, litigation against industrial sand manufacturers and other
aggregates, industrial minerals companies, respirator (dust mask) makers,
and related safety equipment manufacturers by workers alleging health
conditions from workplace exposures to silica was stable, with only a low
number of people pursuing claims each year.118 Recently, however, there
has been a marked increase in the number of silica lawsuits.119 One large
insurance company is handling more than 25,000 silica claims in twentyeight states—a tenfold rise from August 2002.120 E.D. Bullard Co., the
inventor of the hard hat and a maker of respirators, has seen a similar jump
in claims since 2002: 62 cases with 200 plaintiffs in 1999; 156 cases with
4,305 plaintiffs in 2002; and 643 cases with 17,288 plaintiffs in 2003.121
It appears that the same lawsuit-generating tactics that worked to

_______________________________________________________
113
See Deborah R. Hensler, California Asbestos Litigation—The Big Picture, Columns—Asbestos 5
(Aug. 2004).
114
In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 747-48.
115
See Susan Warren, Asbestos Suits Target Makers of Wine, Cars, Soups, Soaps, Wall St. J. B1 (Apr.
12, 2000).
116
See Susan Warren, Plaintiffs Target Companies Whose Premises Contained Any Form of Deadly
Material, Wall St. J. B1 (Jan. 27, 2003).
117
See RAND Rep., supra n. 86, at 94.
118
See Mark A. Behrens et al., Silica: An Overview of Exposure and Litigation in the United States, 20:2
Mealey’s Litig. Rep.: Asbestos 33 (Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Behrens et al.]; Victor E. Schwartz &
Leah Lorber, A Letter to the Trial Judges of America: Help the True Victims of Silica Injuries and Avoid
Another Litigation Crisis, 28 Am. J. of Tr. Advoc. 296 (2004).
119
See Jonathan D. Glater, Suits on Silica Being Compared to Asbestos Cases, N.Y. Times C1 (Sept. 6,
2003) (available at 2003 WLNR 5662921); Kelly Barron, Bonanza or Boondoggle? Plaintiffs’ Lawyers
Hope Silica Could be the Next Asbestos, 28:9 Crain’s Chi. Bus. 35 (Feb. 28, 2005) (available at 2005
WLNR 3322581); Patti Waldmeir, Business Fears Silica Lawsuits Could Wreak Same Havoc as
Asbestosis, Fin. Times 3 (Feb. 2, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR 1400086).
120
See Susan Warren, Silicosis Suits Rise Like Dust/Lawyers in Asbestos Cases Target Many of the Same
Companies, Wall St. J. B5 (Sept. 4, 2003).
121
See Susanne Sclafane, Silica Dust: The Next Asbestos?, 108:18 Natl. Underwriter Prop. & Cas. / Risk
& Ben. Mgmt. 18 (May 10, 2004) (available at 2004 WLNR 14746125); see also Bob Sherwood,
Weighing the Risk from Food and Phones, Fin. Times 12 (Apr. 28, 2003) (available at 2003 WLNR
8136508) (“[s]ilicosis claims [in the United States] are climbing at such a rate that one company has
17,000 suits against it—and it just makes masks designed to protect people from silica dust”).
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generate asbestos claims are now being exploited in the silica context.122
Such tactics include plaintiff recruitment through direct mailings, the use of
marketing firms to develop inventories, free mass screenings,123 mobile xray vans,124 and Internet websites. Screenings of potential silica plaintiffs by
plaintiffs’ law firms and their agents have increased immeasurably during
the past few years.125
“Most commentators point to pending legislative efforts relating to
asbestos litigation, tort-reform initiatives in Mississippi and Texas, and the
use of mass screenings as the reason silicosis ‘victims’ have seemingly
emerged from the woodwork.”126 Some lawyers are even filing asbestos
“re-tread” cases—bringing silica lawsuits on behalf of people who have
already received an asbestos-related recovery.127 As the National Law
Journal reported in February 2005: “One of the most explosive revelations
that has emerged from the [federal silica MDL proceeding] is that at least
half of the approximately 10,000 plaintiffs in the silica MDL had previously
filed asbestos claims.”128

_______________________________________________________
122
See Pendell, supra n. 92; see also Jonathan D. Glater, The Tort Wars, at a Turning Point, N.Y. Times
C1 (Oct. 9, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR 16361092).
123
See Sue Reisinger, Mounting Silica Suits Pose New Threat to Industrial Companies, 13:136 Corp.
Leg. Times Col. 1 (Mar. 2003) [hereinafter Reisinger].
124
See Increase in Screening for Silica Exposure Victims Evident in Texas, 1:2 Mealey’s Litig. Rep.:
Silica 10 (Oct. 18, 2002).
125
See id. Medical screening is big business. See e.g. David M. Setter et al., Why We Have To Defend
Against Screened Cases Now Is the Time for a Change, 2:4 Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Silica 11 (2003)
(detailing deposition testimony regarding profits generated from medical screenings and stating, “[t]hese
individuals make huge amounts of money at other's expense.”).
126
Roy T. Atwood et al., Commentary, In Silica Litigation, The Numbers Alone Dictate Careful Scrutiny
of Injury and Causation, 26:2 Andrews Asbestos Litig. Rptr. 12 (Dec. 4, 2003); see also Asbestos: The
Mixed Dust and FELA Issues: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9
(Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of Lester Brickman, Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of
Yeshiva University) (available at 2005 WL 265224); Gilbert S. Keteltas, Learning the Lessons of
Asbestos: Courts and Defendants Can Do Better in the Case of Silica, 26:6 Andrews Asbestos Litig.
Rptr. 9 (Jan. 15, 2004).
127
See Jonathan D. Glater, Asbestos Claims Decline, but Questions Rise, N.Y. Times C1 (Apr. 6, 2005)
(available at 2005 WLNR 5343368) (stating with respect to the federal silica multidistrict litigation:
“The details of the diagnoses underlying some silica claimants are striking. Some of the same doctors
who diagnosed silicosis in claimants had previously found asbestosis—another disease, which doctors
said was typically characterized by different scarring of a different part of the lungs in the people they
examined.”). “Suffering from both asbestosis and silicosis is, statistically speaking, nearly impossible.”
Carlyn Kolker, Spreading the Blame, Am. Law. 25 (Oct. 2005). One lawyer in the federal silica
litigation, responding to an accusation by the federal judge that the lawyer brought silica claims on behalf
of previous asbestosis claimants, asserted that he “doubt[ed] his clients’ asbestosis diagnoses.” Id. at 25.
128
David Hechler, Silica Plaintiffs Suffer Setbacks: Broad Effects Seen in Fraud Allegations, Natl. L.J.
18 (Feb. 28, 2005); see also Roger Parloff, Diagnosing for Dollars, Fortune 96 (June 13, 2005)
(available at 2005 WLNR 8694138); Jonathan D. Glater, Companies Get Weapon In Injury Suits; Many
Silica-Damage Plaintiffs Also Filed Claims Over Asbestos, N.Y. Times C1 (Feb. 2, 2005) (available at
2005 WLNR 1415209); Jerry Mitchell, Silicosis Screening Process Irks Judge, Clarion-Ledger A1
(Mar. 6, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR 3546204) (explaining that U.S. District Judge Janis Graham
Jack used the word “fraudulent” to describe the process that led to the diagnosis of many of the MDL
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In June 2005, the manager of the federal silica docket, U.S. District
Court Judge Janis Graham Jack of the Southern District of Texas, issued a
scathing, lengthy opinion in which she recommended that all but one of the
10,000 claims on the MDL docket should be dismissed on remand because
the diagnoses were fraudulently prepared.129 “[T]hese diagnoses were
driven by neither health nor justice,” Judge Jack said in her opinion.130
“[T]hey were manufactured for money.”131 As Judge Jack appreciated:
This explosion in the number of silicosis claims in
Mississippi suggests . . . perhaps the worst industrial
disaster in recorded world history.
And yet, these claims do not look anything like
what one would expect from an industrial disaster . . . . The
claims do not involve a single worksite or area, but instead
represent hundreds of worksites scattered throughout the
state of Mississippi, a state whose silicosis mortality rate is
among the lowest in the nation.
Moreover, given the sheer volume of claims–each
supported by a silicosis diagnosis by a physician–one would
expect the CDC or NIOSH to be involved . . . . One would
expect local health departments and physicians groups to be
mobilized. One would expect a flurry of articles and
attention from the media, such as what occurred in 2003
with SARS.

But none of these things have happened. There has
been no response from OSHA, the CDC, NIOSH or the
American Medical Association to this sudden,
unprecedented onslaught of silicosis cases . . . . Likewise,

plaintiffs); David M. Setter & Andrew L. Kalish, Recent Screening Developments: The Silica MDL 1553
Daubert Hearing, Columns—Silica 4 (May 2005). Asbestos personal injury lawyer Steve Kazan of
Oakland, California, has said “[t]he whole thing is somewhere between shameless and shameful.” Justin
Scheck, Critics Sandblast Local Silicosis Suits, 129: 63 Recorder (San Francisco) 7 (Apr. 1, 2005)
(available on Westlaw at 4/1/2005 RECORDER-SF 1).
129
In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
130
Id. at 635.
131
Id.; see also John S. Stadler, Commentary, Judge’s Silica Opinion Exposes Manufactured Tort Claims
to Antiseptic Sunshine, 23:15 Andrews Toxic Torts Litig. Rptr. 10 (Sept. 2, 2005).
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Mississippi’s silicosis epidemic has been greeted with
silence by the media, the public, Congress and the scientific
communities.
.132

In short, this appears to be a phantom epidemic . . .

Indeed, the federal government reports that silica-related deaths
have declined dramatically.133 According to the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health and the U.S. Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), the number of silica-related deaths dropped from 1,157
in 1968, to 448 in 1980, to 308 in 1990, to 187 in 1999, and to 148 in
2002.134 To put these figures into context, the CDC reports that, on average,
400 people in the United States die each year from extreme heat;135 and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 671 workers die annually from falls
“to [a] lower level.”136 A recent study by federal Occupational Safety &
Health Administration staff found that “a downward trend in the airborne
silica exposure levels was observed during 1988-2003.”137
C.

Medical Criteria-Based Solutions

State courts and legislatures are aggressively acting to address
asbestos and silica litigation within their own jurisdictions and borders. For

_______________________________________________________
132
In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 572-73 (emphasis added); see also Mike Tolson,
Attorneys Behind Silicosis Suits Draw U.S. Judge’s Wrath; Houston Legal Firm Fined; Order From
Bench Says Diagnoses Made for the Money, Houston Chron. A1 (July 2, 2005); Editorial, The Silicosis
Sheriff, Wall St. J. A10 (July 14, 2005). A federal grand jury has been convened in Manhattan to
consider possible criminal charges arising out of the federal silica litigation. See Jonathan D. Glater,
Civil Suits Over Silica In Texas Become a Criminal Matter in New York, N.Y. Times C5 (May 18, 2005)
(available at 2005 WLNR 7826957); Editorial, Silicosis, Inc., Wall St. J. A20 (Oct. 27, 2005) (supporting
Justice Department probe of asbestos and silica suits).
133
See Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Natl. Inst. for
Occupational Safety & Health: The Work-Related Lung Disease Surveillance Rpt., 2002 54 tbl. 3-1 (Pub.
No. 2003-111, 2003).
134
See Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Natl. Inst. for
Occupational Safety & Health, Worker Health Chartbook 2004 169 (Pub. No. 2004-146, Sept. 2004)
(available at
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/chartbook/); Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control
& Prevention, Silicosis Mortality, Prevention, and Control—United States, 1968-2002, MMWR Wkly. 1
(Apr. 29, 2005) (available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5416a2.htm), printed in
29:21 J. Am. Med. Assn. 2585 (June 1, 2005).
135
See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Washington, D.C.,
About CDC’s Program,
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/extremeheat/program.asp (last modified May 14, 2004).
136
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries Data,
http://www.bls.gov/iif/ (accessed Jan. 27, 2006).
137
A.S. Yassin et al., Occupational Exposure to Crystalline Silica Dust in the United States, 1988-2003,
113 Envtl. Health Persps. 3255, 3255 (Mar. 1, 2005) (available at 2005 WLNR 5475971).
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instance, a growing number of courts have chosen to implement an
unimpaired asbestos docket (also called an inactive docket, pleural registry,
or deferred docket) to give trial priority to the truly sick and preserve
compensation for those that may become sick in the future, rather than have
those resources depleted by earlier-filing unimpaired claimants.138 Claims
placed on an unimpaired docket are exempt from discovery and do not age.
Claimants are moved to the active docket when they present credible
medical evidence of impairment.139
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, three major jurisdictions adopted
unimpaired asbestos dockets—Massachusetts (coordinated litigation)
(September 1986);140 Cook County (Chicago), Illinois (March 1991); and
Baltimore City (December 1992).141 Since 2002, unimpaired asbestos
dockets have been implemented in Minnesota (coordinated litigation) (June
2005); St. Clair, Illinois (February 2005); Portsmouth, Virginia (August
2004); Madison County, Illinois (January 2004);142 Syracuse, New York
(January 2003); New York City (December 2002); and Seattle, Washington
(December 2002).143 A 2005 RAND report concluded that one of the “most
significant developments in asbestos case processing” has been the
“reemergence of deferred dockets as a popular court management tool.”144
Some jurists, including the coordinating judge for all South Carolina

_______________________________________________________
138

See In re USG Corp., 290 B.R. 223, 227 n.3 (Bankr. Del. Feb. 2003) (stating that “[t]he practical
benefits of dealing with the sickest claimants first have been apparent to the courts for many years and
have led to the adoption of deferred claims registries in many jurisdictions.”); Victor E. Schwartz et al.,
Addressing the “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Cases: Consolidation Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural
Registries) and Case Management Plans that Defer Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 271
(2004); Mark A. Behrens & Manuel López, Unimpaired Asbestos Dockets: They Are Constitutional, 24
Rev. Litig. 253 (2005).
139
See Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Policy 541 (1992).
140
Judge Hiller Zobel, who adopted the Massachusetts unimpaired docket, has said that it has been
“really a very good system that has worked out . . . .” Inactive Asbestos Dockets: Are They Easing the
Flow of Litigation?, Columns—Asbestos 3 (Feb. 2002). Jim Ryan, special master of the Massachusetts
asbestos litigation, has described the unimpaired docket as “an extremely useful tool,” saying, “I don’t
see any downside for creating one anywhere else.” Id. at 70.
141
See Mark A. Behrens & Monica G. Parham, Stewardship for the Sick: Preserving Assets for Asbestos
Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 33 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
142
Madison County asbestos plaintiffs’ lawyer John Simmons has said that the unimpaired docket has
been “a win-win . . . . If they (plaintiffs without symptoms) never get sick, they never get paid, and that’s
the best scenario. And it preserves the dollars that are going to be spent on settlements for those who are
truly deserving.” Paul Hampel, Lack of Trust Poisons Efforts to Reform Asbestos Litigation, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch A1 (Sept. 22, 2004).
143
See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, Asbestos Litigation: Momentum Builds for State-Based
Medical Criteria Solutions to Address Filings by the Non-Sick, 20:6 Mealey’s Litig. Rep.: Asbestos 33
(Apr. 13, 2005).
144
Rand Rep., supra n. 86, at xx.
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asbestos cases and the judge presiding over the federal asbestos docket, have
entered orders dismissing claims filed by the non-sick.145
The latest trend is for state legislatures to require asbestos and silica
claimants to demonstrate physical impairment in order to bring or maintain a
claim. In 2004, Ohio became the first state to enact such medical criteria
legislation for asbestos claims.146 Ohio also passed silica medical criteria
legislation to help ensure that silica filings would not be exacerbated by
plaintiffs’ lawyers who might be discouraged from bringing weak or
meritless asbestos suits as a result of the asbestos medical criteria law.147 In
2005, Georgia, Texas, and Florida enacted asbestos and silica medical
criteria legislation.148 These laws draw support from a model Asbestos and
Silica Claims Priorities Act developed by ALEC149 and a February 2003
resolution by the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates
calling for the enactment of federal medical criteria reform legislation.150
The number of states that consider medical criteria legislation will no doubt
continue as more states explore solutions to address asbestos and silica
litigation within their borders.
V.

THE JURY PATRIOTISM ACT

According to a 2004 ABA opinion poll, eighty-four percent of
Americans believe jury service is an important civic duty and three in four
Americans would prefer to have their case heard by a jury should they find
themselves in court.151 Despite such beliefs, courts around the country
report serious problems with low response rates to jury summonses. One
study found that, on average, about twenty percent of those summoned to
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145

See Mark A. Behrens, Some Proposals for Courts Interested in Helping Sick Claimants and Solving
Serious Problems in Asbestos Litigation, 54 Baylor L. Rev. 331 (2002).
146
See Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.91 et seq. (Anderson 2005); see also Kurtis A. Tunnell et al., New Ohio
Asbestos Reform Law Protects Victims and State Economy, 26:22 Andrews Asbestos Litig. Rep. 10
(Aug. 26, 2004).
147
See Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.84 et seq. (Anderson 2005).
148
See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, State-Based Medical Criteria For Asbestos Suits Gains
Momentum, 15:13 Legal Opinion Letter (Wash. Leg. Found.) (July 1, 2005).
149
See Mark A. Behrens & Phil S. Goldberg, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis in a Nutshell, The State
Factor (Am. Legis. Exch. Council July 2004).
150
See Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Mar. 5, 2003)
(statement of Hon. Dennis Archer, President-Elect, Am. Bar Assn.) (available at 2003 WL 785387); Am.
Bar Assn., H. of Delegates, ABA Standard for Non-Malignant Asbestos Related Disease Claims (res.
adopted Feb. 2003).
151
Am. Bar Assn., Jury Service: Is Fulfilling Your Civic Duty a Trial? (Harris Interactive July 2004)
(available at
http://www.abanews.org/releases/juryreport.pdf).
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jury duty each year in state courts do not respond.152
The contradiction between strong public support for the jury system
and the avoidance of jury service suggests that the jury system needs to be
reformed to better serve Americans. It needs to become more user friendly.
All citizens should equally share the obligation of jury duty regardless of
their occupation and income level. Not only does requiring all to serve
more fairly distribute the burden of jury service throughout the public, but it
is also necessary to ensure a representative jury. The absence of a
representative jury may mean that plaintiffs and defendants in both civil and
criminal cases may not receive a fair trial before a true jury of their peers.
ALEC has adopted model legislation known as the Jury Patriotism
Act (JPA) to alleviate the financial burden and inconvenience placed on
those called to serve, while making it more difficult for people to escape
from jury service without showing true hardship.153 The JPA, which has the
support of a wide range of organizations from across the political spectrum,
is part of a broad effort to improve the jury system for all Americans.154 It is
a good government bill, not tort reform.
The JPA’s first goal is to make jury service more flexible and
alleviate a juror’s fear of being selected for a lengthy trial without fair
compensation.155 Under the JPA, individuals may schedule jury service
around their business and family commitments through a one-time
automatic postponement system.156 The summoned juror would simply
contact the appropriate court official and provide a date on which he or she

_______________________________________________________
152

See Robert G. Boatright, Improving Citizen Response to Jury Summonses: A Report With
Recommendations 13 (Am. Judicature Socy. 1998); see also Ted M. Eades, Revisiting the Jury System in
Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in Dallas County, 54 SMU L. Rev. 1813, 1815 (2001) (joint study
conducted by the Dallas Morning News and Southern Methodist University found that in Dallas County,
Texas “at least 80% of the people summoned each week for jury duty disregard their summonses and
refuse to participate in the system.”). Some estimate that as many as two-thirds of the approximately 15
million Americans summoned do not report for jury service. See David Schneider, Jury Deliberations
and the Need for Jury Reform: An Outsider’s View, 36:4 Judges J. 23, 25 (Fall 1997).
153
See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Jury Patriotism Act (approved by ALEC Bd. of Dirs. Mar. 2003).
154
For example, ABA President Robert Grey made jury service improvement his top priority during his
2004-05 term. In February 2005, this effort culminated in the ABA House of Delegates adopting
Principles for Juries and Jury Trials. Am. Bar Assn., ABA Jury Principles,
http://www.abanet.org/jury/principles.html (accessed Dec, 20, 2005). The JPA is fully consistent with
the ABA Principles, which incorporate several JPA provisions.
155
See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Jury Patriotism Act, supra, n. 153.
156

See id.
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would be able to appear for jury service within six months.157 As the ABA
has observed, “[d]eferral of jury service accommodates the public-necessity
rationale upon which most exemptions and automatic excuses were
originally premised, while enabling a broader spectrum of the community to
serve as jurors.”158
The JPA also would reduce the length and frequency of jury service.
Summoned jurors would serve no more than one day unless they are
selected to serve on a trial. “One-day/one-trial” has been adopted by about
one-half of the state courts nationwide.159 It is favored by jurors who spend
less time in waiting rooms.160 Employers also like the approach because it
means fewer days absent from work for jury duty for employees.161 The
JPA also recommends that citizens not be required to serve any more than
once every two years, eliminating the potential for some citizens to be called
repeatedly for jury service and better distributing the obligation to serve
throughout the eligible population of potential jurors.162
In addition, the JPA addresses one of the most persistent factors that
limits the ability of people to serve on juries—low compensation. The JPA
contains a provision for a “Lengthy Trial Fund” to ensure that all citizens
are able to participate as a juror on a long trial without severe financial
hardship.163 Lengthy trials are uncommon, but jurors who find themselves
called to serve on such a trial may be subject to extreme financial hardship.
Self-employed individuals, small business owners and employees, wage
earners, and independent contractors are especially likely to request to be
excused from such trials. As a housepainter who served on an extended trial
and lost over $3,500 in income told the San Francisco Chronicle, “When I
started jury duty, I had a nice savings. Now I’m itching and scratching just
to get by.”164
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See id.
Am. Bar Assn., Standards Related to Juror Use & Mgt. 51 (1993).
159
See The Natl. Ctr. for St. Cts., Jury Administration and Management,
http://www.ncsconline.org/Projects_Initiatives/BPI/JuryAdminManage.htm (accessed Feb. 25, 2006).
160
See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Jury Service: It’s Changing in Ohio, 32 Cap. U. L. Rev.
158

101, 106 (2003).
161
In a study of juror attitudes, approximately ninety percent of 5,500 jurors selected the one-day/onetrial system as preferable to a 30-day term, and a majority would not object to being called again. See
David E. Kasunic, One Day/One Trial: A Major Improvement in the Jury System, 67:2 Judicature 81
(Aug. 1983).
162
See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Jury Patriotism Act, supra, n. 153.
163

See id.
Torri Minton, Jurors Sometimes Get the Harshest Punishment at Trials / $15-A-Day Doesn’t Come
Close to Making Up for Lost Wages, San Francisco Chron. J1 (Dec. 16, 2001).
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The JPA’s Lengthy Trial Fund would provide those jurors who are
not fully compensated by their employers and who would not be otherwise
able to serve with up to $150 per day after the third day of service. After the
tenth day of jury service, all jurors who do not receive their usual income
during jury service would receive compensation of up to $300 per day after
the tenth day of service for the remainder of the trial. The amount of
supplemental compensation would never exceed the juror’s usual daily
income. The additional compensation, including the costs of administering
the Fund, would be financed by a nominal filing fee paid by each attorney
who files a civil case or a pleading in response to a complaint. As the
Chicago Tribune commented, the Lengthy Trial Fund “would encourage a
more diverse cross-section of the public to serve on juries. Most important,
in an era of great cynicism about the political process, this would lend
overdue support to one of the few public institutions where citizens make
big decisions every day.”165 The unanimous response from judges and
jurors to the additional compensation made available by the Fund has been,
according to one Arizona jury administrator, an overwhelming expression of
appreciation.166
Given the greater convenience of serving, the model Act seeks to
ensure that all people, regardless of income or background, serve on juries.
Some states unnecessarily limit the jury pool and automatically exempt
potential jurors from service based on their occupation.167 For some reason

_______________________________________________________
165

The Verdict: Better Pay for Juries, Chi. Trib. Zone C 26 (Sept. 24, 2004).
See G. Thomas Munsterman & Cary Silverman, The Jury Patriotism Act In Arizona: Examining its
Impact After One Year (forthcoming 2006).
167
See e.g. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 612-6 (LEXIS 1993) (exempting attorneys, heads of executive
departments, elected officials, judges, ministers or priests, physicians, dentists, members of the armed
forces, and members of police and fire departments); Ind. Code Ann. § 33-4-5-7 (West 2004) (repealed)
(exempting members of the armed forces; elected or appointed officials of the government; honorary
military staff officers; officers or enlisted persons of the guard reserve forces; veterinarians; persons
serving as a member of the board of school commissioners of the city of Indianapolis; dentists; members
of a police or fire departments); 14 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1211 (2005) (exempting the Governor, judges,
physicians, dentists, sheriffs, attorneys, and those in the state military forces); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 6.020
(LEXIS 1998 & Supp. 2003) (exempting federal or state officers, judges, attorneys, certain county
officers, police officers, certain locomotive operators, correctional officers, employees of the legislature,
physicians, optometrists, and dentists); Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-1-103(a) (Supp. 2005) (excusing from the
initial summons all persons holding public office, practicing attorneys, certified public accountants,
physicians, clergy, acting professors or teachers, members of fire companies, full-time law enforcement
officers, pharmacists, practicing registered professional nurses, and those serving in the national guard);
Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-341 to 8.01-341.1 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (exempting the President and Vice
President of the United States, members of Congress, members of the General Assembly, attorneys,
judges, members of the State Corporation Commission, members of the Virginia Workers’
Compensation Commission, sheriffs, police officers, certain penitentiary and jail officers and employees,
mariners, and certain small business operators).
166
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or another, these people are regarded as too important: socially, politically,
or economically to serve on a jury, such as health care professionals,
lawyers, or government officials. Other exemptions appear to be obsolete
remnants of a time past.168 Some people simply feel, “I don’t belong here
with these people.”169 As the ABA has recognized, however, “broad
categorical exceptions not only reduce the inclusiveness and
representativeness of a jury panel, but also place a disproportionate burden
on those who are not exempt,” most notably blue-collar workers, the retired,
and the unemployed.170 For this reason, the JPA eliminates all exemptions
or disqualification based on a person’s occupation. This cross-section of the
public is necessary to ensure a diverse and representative jury and to
distribute the burden of jury service equally throughout the population.
The JPA also addresses the ease at which citizens can avoid jury
service, either through the vague standard for a hardship excuse or simply
not appearing in court. In many states, the standard for an excuse is subject
to abuse and provides little guidance to judges.171 Many states simply define
the grounds for an excuse as “undue hardship, severe inconvenience, or
public necessity.”172 Given the added convenience of an automatic
postponement, shorter term of service, and limited frequency of service,
citizens should be expected to fulfill their important civic duty to participate
in the justice system. The JPA makes it more difficult for the privileged to
avoid jury service by tightening the standard for hardship excuses. Citizens,
who would be inconvenienced by jury service due to scheduling conflicts or
work or educational commitments, could take advantage of the
postponement procedure provided by the Bill and request deferral of their
service to a more convenient time. Individuals requesting to be excused for
hardship also would be expected to provide the court with documentation
supporting the need for release or dismissal from jury service.
Finally, the JPA addresses the increasing number of people who
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For example, locomotive engineers, locomotive firemen, conductors, brakemen, switchmen, and
engine foremen may be surprised to learn that they are exempt from jury service in Nevada. See Nev.
Rev. Stat. 6.020(1)(d).
169
Julia Vitullo-Martin, Successful Innovations Will Require Citizen Education and Participation, 73JUN N.Y. St. B.J. 43, 44 (June 2001) (quoting comment of “an elegant woman” summoned to jury duty
in New York State one year prior to the state’s elimination of occupational exemptions).
170
Am. Bar Assn., Standards Related to Juror Use & Mgt., supra n. 158, at 51.
171
In some areas, excuse rates are extraordinarily high. For example, in one recent year, twenty-eight
percent of jurors (those who actually appeared for jury service) in Baltimore, Maryland, City Circuit
Court were excused, and excuse rates reached as high as thirty-nine percent and forty-one percent in
Roland Park and Mt. Washington, Maryland, respectively. See Peter Geier, Baltimore’s Jury Pool
Expanded, Daily Record (Baltimore, MD) (June 20, 2003).
172
See e.g. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 40.013 (West 2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29A.100(1) (LEXIS 2003); W.
Va. Code § 52-1-11(b) (2000).
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simply choose to ignore jury summonses—a situation that has led to a
critical shortage of jurors in some areas. Most states currently provide that a
person can be held in contempt of court or required to pay a minimal civil
fine, comparable to a parking ticket, for failing to appear for jury service.173
It is no secret that such provisions, however minimal, are rarely imposed or
enforced by courts. The JPA suggests higher penalties, such as making
failure to appear in court a criminal offense.174 In practice, most states that
have adopted legislation based on the JPA have chosen to increase civil
fines.175
Recently, legislation based on the JPA has become law in
Alabama,176 Arizona,177 Colorado,178 Louisiana,179 Mississippi,180
Missouri,181 Ohio,182 Oklahoma,183 and Utah.184 Maryland,185 Texas,186 and
Vermont187 have adopted legislation loosely based on the JPA.
VI.

THE LAWSUIT ABUSE REDUCTION ACT

Congress is currently considering legislation called the Lawsuit
Abuse Reduction Act of 2005 (LARA) to address frivolous litigation and
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See e.g. 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 305/15 (West 1999) (contempt and fine of between $5 and $100 unless
good cause shown); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-13 (2003) (fine of not more than $50 unless renders an excuse
deemed sufficient); Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 62.111 (2005) (contempt action subjecting juror to fine of
between $10 and $100 unless provides a “reasonable excuse”); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-356 (2000 & Supp.
2005) (fine of between $25 and $100 unless provides a sufficient excuse).
174
See Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Jury Patriotism Act, supra, n. 153.
175 See e.g. S.B. 87, 2005 Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005) (increasing maximum fine from $100 to $300) (to be
codified at Ala. Code § 12-16-82); H.B. 2520, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-334)
(increasing minimum fine from $100 to $500) codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-334); Am. Sub S.B. 71,
125the Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004) (increasing minimum fine from $25 to $100) (codified at
Ohio Rev. Code § 2313.99(A)); H. 538, 2003-2004 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2004) (increasing maximum fine from
$50 to $200) (codified at Vt. Code § 958).
Ala. Sen. 87, 1st Spec. Sess. (2005).
177
Ariz. H. 2520, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (2003), as amended by Ariz. H. 2305, 47th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (2005).
178
Colo. H. 1159, 2004 Leg. Sess. (2004).
179
La. H. 2008, Reg. Sess. (2003).
180
Miss. H. 13, 1st Extra Sess. (2004).
181
Mo. Sen. 1211, 92nd Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (2004), as amended by Mo. Sen. 420 & 344, 93rd
Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (2005).
182
Ohio Amend. Substitute Sen. 71, 125th Gen. Assembly., Reg. Sess. (2004).
183
Okla. Sen. 479, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (2004).
184
Utah H. 324, Gen. Sess. (2003).
185
Md. H. 1185, Reg. Sess. (2005).
186
Tex. Sen. 1704, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2005).
187
Vt. H. 538, 2003-04 Leg. Sess. (2004).
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forum shopping abuse. LARA seeks to re-institute mandatory sanctions for
frivolous lawsuits by reforming Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.188 The Act would reverse changes made to Rule 11 in 1993 that
rendered sanctions discretionary rather than mandatory. Unfortunately, the
1993 amendments allowed judges to ignore or forget sanctions. For that
reason, irresponsible personal injury lawyers could game the legal system.189
The proposed legislation also would reverse the 1993 prohibition against
money sanctions for discovery abuses.
Second, as stated, LARA addresses rampant nationwide forum
shopping. Forum shopping occurs when what some call “litigation tourists”
are guided by their attorneys into bringing claims in so-called “Judicial
Hellholes.”190 These jurisdictions have become a powerful magnet for outof-state plaintiffs that have absolutely nothing to do with the location. The
plaintiffs were not injured in the jurisdiction, never lived in the jurisdiction,
and do not work in the jurisdiction. Litigation tourists do not help the states
that they visit. They pay no taxes, only burdening the courts of that state
that are paid for by local taxpayers. They delay justice to those who live
there. The litigation tourist is only there to sue.
The LARA helps shut down these “Judicial Hellholes” with equity
and fairness. The LARA would allow a plaintiff to file a case where he
resides at the time of filing, or resided at the time of the alleged injury,
where the circumstances giving rise to the injury occurred, or in the place of
the defendant’s principal place of business.191
VII.

CONCLUSION

The civil justice reform movement is not static; it is a dynamic
chess match. As civil defendants have had to confront new issues, the
reform effort has evolved to keep up with these changes. Increasingly,
business-supported federal and state civil justice efforts are focused on
procedural reforms that neither limit an injured person’s ability to sue nor
cap the amount of actual damages the person may recover. Examples at the
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H.R. 420, 109th Congress (Oct. 27, 2005).
When the 1993 amendments weakening Rule 11 were approved, Justice Scalia dissented from the
process, noting that, “In my view, those who file frivolous suits and pleadings, should have no ‘safe
harbor.’ The Rules should be solicitous of the abused (the courts and the opposing party), and not of the
abuser. Under the revised Rule [11], parties will be able to file thoughtless, reckless, and harassing
pleadings, secure in the knowledge that they have nothing to lose: If objection is raised, they can retreat
without penalty.” Amendments to the R. of Civ. Proc., 146 F.R.D. 401, 508 (1993).
190
See ATRA Hellholes Rep., supra n. 11.
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H.R. 420, 109th Congress (Oct. 27, 2005).
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federal level include the federal Class Action Fairness Act of 2005192 and
the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act193 currently before Congress. At the state
level, procedural reforms are being promoted as ways to address
problematic aspects of state attorneys general litigation, excessive
noneconomic damages awards, mass filings by unimpaired asbestos and
silica claimants, and to improve the representativeness and functioning of
the jury system.
In fact, the label most often used to describe too many businesssupported legal efforts of the past—tort reform—does not even fit these new
initiatives. They are civil justice reforms, not “roll-backs” to tort liability.
These changes, however, have been virtually ignored by most critics of
more traditional, substantive reform proposals. It often seems that critics of
reform are playing badminton while supporters of reform are playing
baseball. Perhaps this is driven by a knee jerk reaction that any reform
supported by business must be adverse to plaintiffs. As this article has
demonstrated, this is simply not true.
We invite debate on the new issues identified in this article with the
hope of identifying areas of common ground. This has occurred already in
the asbestos arena where lawyers who represent cancer victims have spoken
in favor of medical criteria-based solutions to the litigation because their
clients would benefit from such reforms. Jury system improvements are
another area where attorneys representing plaintiffs and defendants can
work together to promote good government reforms like the Jury Patriotism
Act that are neither pro-plaintiff nor pro-defendant. There may be other
areas where bridges can be built to improve the legal system and make it
fairer for all parties. We hope that this article stimulates that discussion and
helps to identify those areas.

_______________________________________________________
192

Sen. Rpt. 109-14 (Feb. 28, 2005).
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H.R. 420, 109th Congress (Oct. 27, 2005).
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